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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2003, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rendered a decision that
would pave the way for drastic changes in Washington State's election
process. In Democratic Party of Washington v. Reed, the court held that
Washington's nearly seventy-year-old blanket primary was unconstitu-
tional, and the Supreme Court declined to review the case.' The Ninth
Circuit professed to be bound by California Democratic Party v. Jones,
the Supreme Court case that ruled California's blanket primary unconsti-
tutional just three years earlier, ignoring the argument that Washington's
blanket primary differed materially from California's. 2 What followed
was a m~lde of voter disapproval and disappointment. The Washington
State Legislature reacted with damage control efforts but was conflicted.
Legislators were pressured by voters who yearned for a primary system
that would closely replicate the invalidated blanket primary voters had
come to love. They also faced pressure from Washington's political par-
ties to close the primary so that voters would be forced to select candi-
dates for all offices from only one party. Indicative of the turmoil the loss
of the blanket primary caused, the Washington State Legislature enacted
a nonpartisan primary; Washington's governor vetoed that provision,
t J.D. Candidate, Seattle University School of Law, 2006; B.A., University of Washington, 2003.
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resulting in the enactment of a Montana-style primary; 3 Washingtonians
voted for an initiative to enact the nonpartisan primary as a means of pre-
serving as many of the virtues of the constitutionally-flawed blanket pri-
mary as possible; and, at the time of this publication, the state of the pri-
mary remains up in the air as Washington voters await the Ninth Cir-
cuit's ruling on the appeal of a decision holding the nonpartisan primary
unconstitutional.
This Comment argues that Reed should be overturned because it
fails to appreciate the material distinction between the Washington and
California primaries, and that Jones did not render all blanket primaries
unconstitutional. In doing so, this Comment examines blanket primaries
more generally and argues against the typical perception of political pri-
maries as merely a component of party machinery. Part II explores the
historical background of candidate nomination in political parties. Part
III details the blanket primary today by exploring the California and
Washington systems and the cases invalidating them. Part IV contends
that blanket primaries may be deemed constitutional when they are care-
fully analyzed on a state by state basis, in their state specific context.
This section also debunks the notion that political parties have the same
rights as purely private organizations and posits that blanket primaries do
not violate the freedom of association. In addition, Part IV analyzes a
unique form of disenfranchisement that only blanket primaries can pre-
vent and casts the oft-argued distinction between primary and general
elections as illusory. This section concludes by tackling the issue of party
raiding, arguing that although theoretically possible, it is unlikely, ulti-
mately irrelevant, and not the concern of states.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE TwO-PARTY SYSTEM AND THE PRIMARY
Understanding the primary's various permutations requires an un-
derstanding of its relation to the two-party system and how the primary
system evolved from other, more party-centered forms of candidate
nomination.
A. The Two-Party System
The Constitution does not mention political parties, not because
they were inconceivable to the Framers but because they were viewed
3. The Montana-style primary is an open primary in which voters privately choose one party's
ballot. See Andrew Garber, House Approves Louisiana-Style Primary, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 9,
2004, at B2.
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negatively.4 Thomas Jefferson's distaste for parties exemplifies the view
of the Founders: Party affiliation "is the last degradation of a free and
moral agent. If I could not go to heaven but with a party, I would not go
there at all." 5
American party politics nevertheless emerged soon after ratifica-
tion.6 George Washington's departure from the Presidency marked the
emergence of American partisanship, with a debate brewing between
notions of strong, centralized government advocated by Alexander Ham-
ilton and state-dominated, decentralized government advocated by Tho-
mas Jefferson and James Madison.7 In the mid 1850s, both the Democ-
ratic and Republican parties established national committees with one
representative from each state,8 and it is within the context of political
parties that the primary election evolved as a way to nominate party can-
didates.
B. Evolution of the Primary
Relatively speaking, the political primary is a new phenomenon.
The oldest form of candidate nomination was the legislative caucus
whereby a party's elected officials chose party candidates for the primary
ballot in an informal meeting.9 Due to concerns that the caucus system
was too unrepresentative and too cumbersome to accommodate the
growth of cities, the convention system arose as a replacement. 10 In the
convention system, party members chose delegates to send to formal
nomination meetings."1 Critics condemned the convention system for
being corrupt, fostering intimidation and bribery, and being class- and
boss-ridden.12 As a result of these criticisms, the direct primary system
emerged as an attempt to "return nominations 'to the people"' by taking
control from the party and giving it to the state.1
3
4. STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC McKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 264 (1993); BURT
NEUBORNE & ARTHUR EISENBERG, THE RIGHTS OF CANDIDATES AND VOTERS: THE BASIC ACLU
GUIDE FOR VOTERS AND CANDIDATES 166 (Avon Books 1980) (1976).
5. THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert Ellery Bergh eds.,
memorial ed.) (1903-04).
6. See NEUBORNE & EISENBERG, supra note 4, at 166.
7. LARRY J. SABATO & BRUCE LARSON, THE PARTY'S JUST BEGUN: SHAPING POLITICAL
PARTIES FOR AMERICA'S FUTURE 25 (2d ed. 2002).
8. Id. at 33.
9. CHARLES R. ADRIAN & MICHAEL R. FINE, STATE AND LOCAL POLITICS 152 (1991); Lauren
Hancock, Note, The Life of the Party: Analyzing Political Parties' First Amendment Associational
Rights when the Primary Election Process is Construed Along a Continuum 88 MINN. L. REV. 159,
164 (2003).
10. ADRIAN & FINE, supra note 9, at 152; HANCOCK, supra note 9, at 164-165.
11. ADRIAN & FINE, supra note 9, at 152; HANCOCK, supra note 9, at 164-165.
12. ADRIAN & FINE, supra note 9, at 152; HANCOCK, supra note 9, at 164-165.
13. ADRIAN & FINE, supra note 9, at 152; HANCOCK, supra note 9, at 164-165.
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Political parties were not initially adverse to the adoption of prima-
ries as nomination devices. 14 As America became more populous, urban-
ized, and heterogeneous, informal nomination procedures became inade-
quate. 15 In fact, parties advocated for primaries as a response to changing
demographics. 16 The primary system was embodied first in party rule and
then in state laws. 17 The primary was first used in Pennsylvania in the
mid-1800s, and Wisconsin first adopted the direct primary as a compul-
sory statewide nomination method in 1903.18 Wisconsin adopted the di-
rect primary due to the Republican Party's domination of the state for
nearly fifty years, which had led to concerns that the state was overly
hostile to progressive legislation and candidates.' 9 Nonetheless, the pri-
mary was first put to "general use" in the South, with the West, Midwest,
and East following suit.20 Today, use of the primary system in the United
States is widespread, with some states employing it as a hybrid with the
convention system. 2' The primary is an interesting political beast; while
it serves a governmental purpose, its history reveals that it is a function
of the parties themselves.
However, the primary system did not meet the parties' expecta-
tions. Arguably, returning candidate nomination to the people merely led
to the nomination of people with recognizable political names. 22 The
adoption of the primary is also seen to have undermined the strength and
organization of the parties. It has facilitated ticket-splitting, whereby vot-
ers vote for candidates from more than one party in the same election. In
the 1880s, a highly partisan period, ticket-splitting was widespread, ac-
counting for at least twenty-five percent of apparent party members in
some regions. 23 Today, ticket-splitting still has a strong presence in
American politics, and there are some indications that American voters
14. ALAN WARE, THE AMERICAN DIRECT PRIMARY: PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND
TRANSFORMATION IN THE NORTH 22 (2002).
15. Id.; "In a 'face-to-face' society, most citizens knew most other citizens, or at least knew
who they were. Consequently, politics could largely be organized on an informal basis-that is,
without formal, or legally binding, rules." Id. at 34.
16. Id. at21.
17. MALCOLM E. JEWELL & SARAH M. MOREHOUSE, POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTIONS IN
AMERICAN STATES 101 (4th ed. 2001).
18. ADRIAN & FINE, supra note 9, at 153.
19. GARY WEKKN, DEMOCRAT VERSUS DEMOCRAT: THE NATIONAL PARTY'S CAMPAIGN TO
CLOSE THE WISCONSIN PRIMARY 45-46 (1984).
20. ADRIAN & FINE, supra note 9, at 153. In the early 1900s, the majority of states chose the
closed primary. WARE, supra note 14, at 127-128.
21. ADRIAN & FINE, supra note 9, at 152.
22. Id.
23. See WARE, supra note 14, at 36.
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view ticket-splitting as a sign of intelligence. 24 The primary system ar-
guably has further undermined the power of party politics, by creating
competition within, rather than among, the party structure.2 5
Several other drawbacks of the primary system as a means of se-
lecting party candidates stem from the fact that the primary system ne-
cessitates an additional election. It has been argued that the primary
negatively affects voter turnout because voters are generally less likely to
vote in the primary than in the general election.26 Thus the voters who do
turn out to vote in primaries may be unrepresentative of the party.27 This
added election also means that candidates have to do more campaigning,
and parties are unlikely to fund candidates' campaigns in contested pri-
maries. 28 The added expense of campaigning for the primary election
may mean that the candidate is less equipped to succeed in the general
29election. In sum, political parties first sought primaries but, as they felt
the practical effects, the political parties reversed their position and sub-
sequently opposed the primary system.
C. Types of Primaries
Primaries can generally be classified into two categories: nonparti-
san and partisan.3 ° In nonpartisan primaries, the names of all candidates
running for office are listed on the ballot without a party designation.
31
Twice the number of candidates needed to proceed to the general elec-
tion to face off, regardless of whether the top vote-getters are from the
same party. 32 This runoff style of election has the benefit of ensuring that
the winner receives a majority, rather than a mere plurality, of the vote.33
In some non-partisan primaries, the candidate receiving a simple major-
ity is elected without having to face the runner up in the general elec-
tion.34 Some states employ this method for nonpartisan offices, such as
24. SABATO & LARSON, supra note 7, at 121-123. "[l]n a 1996 Media Studies Center/Roper
Center survey, a sizable majority of reported typically splitting their tickets in elections . . These
high percentages ... may reflect split-ticket voting below the national level."
25. JEWELL & MOREHOUSE, supra note 17, at 140; SABATO & LARSON, supra note 7, at 4;
WARE, supra note 14.
26. ADRIAN & FINE, supra note 9, at 156; but see JEWELL & MOREHOUSE, supra note 17, at
123.
27. JEWELL & MOREHOUSE, supra note 17, at 140.
28. ADRIAN & FINE, supra note 7, at 156 ("[A] candidate's ability to raise enough funds to pay
for commercials becomes even more important in primary campaigns than it is in general elec-
tions."); JEWELL & MOREHOUSE, supra note 17, at 128.
29. JEWELL & MOREHOUSE, supra note 17, at 140.






Seattle University Law Review
judgeships, and others utilize the runoff method in tandem with their par-
tisan primaries. 35 This is particularly true in the South, where the Democ-
ratic primary was historically so influential and drew so many candidates
that none was likely to get a majority of the vote.36 For example, Louisi-
ana uses a purely nonpartisan primary election for statewide and con-
gressional offices. 37 The system emerged in 1972 when Democratic gu-
bernatorial candidate Edwin W. Edwards was elected after having to
compete in and win three elections: the Democratic primary, the Democ-
ratic runoff, and the general election. Edwards's frustration with the sys-
tem led him to push the legislature to make changes.38 The new system,
implemented after Edwards's election, effectively balanced the power
between Democratic and Republican parties.39 Prior to Edwards's
changes, the Democratic Party had such strong roots in Louisiana that the
Democratic primary was viewed as determinative.40 Today, under Lou-
isiana's nonpartisan system, Republicans are better equipped to provide
real competition for Democratic candidates.4 ' Unlike Louisiana, the vast
majority of primaries are partisan.
There are four types of partisan primaries: closed, semi-closed,
open, and blanket. The different types fall along a continuum, with
closed primaries being the most restrictive of voter choice and blanket
primaries being the most permissive. In closed primaries, voters are re-
quired to register their party affiliation by a certain date before the elec-
tion, and the state maintains a record of the registration.42 On Election
Day, voters may only choose candidates from their party.43 Voters who
define themselves as independents may not vote in these types of prima-
ries. 44 Voters wishing to change their party registration must do so by a
specified deadline.45 Closed primaries are prevalent in Northeastern
states and illustrate the strong party presence and control in the region.46
35. JEWELL & MOREHOUSE, supra note 17, at 104-105.
36. Id. at 105.
37. Id. at 104.
38. Id.
39. Louis Jacobson, Louisiana Elections: Persistently Weird, NAT'L J., Sept. 20, 2003, at 2894.
40. Id.
41. See id.
42. ADRIAN & FINE, supra note 9, at 154. Laws known as durational affiliation provisions
require voters to declare party affiliation in advance of primary elections. NEUBORNE & EISENBERG,
supra note 4, at 173-174; JEWELL & MOREHOUSE, supra note 17, at 103.
43. ADRIAN & FINE, supra note 9, at 154.
44. See generally Charles E. Borden, Primary Elections, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 263, 264
(2001).
45. JEWELL & MOREHOUSE, supra note 17, at 103.
46. Id. at 105. Another indicator of party strength is the use of pre-primary endorsements. Id. at
122; 106-118.
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States with semi-closed primaries permit voters to register or
change their party preference on the day of the election, and some permit
independents to vote.47 States record voters' party preferences in semi-
closed primaries. 48 The state does not record the voter preference in an
open primary. 49 This type of primary is common in Northeastern and
Midwestern states.
50
Open primaries require voters to choose a party's ballot on Election
Day, either by publicly requesting a certain ballot before entering the
voting booth or by making their choice privately in the voting booth.5 1
Voters are required to vote only for the candidates within their party.52
The blanket primary is considered the most permissive type of pri-
mary. In a blanket primary, voters choose one candidate for each avail-
able seat, irrespective of the voters' or the candidates' political affilia-
tion. 3 Voters are free to cross party lines for different offices and are
completely unrestrained by party labels.5 4 Only when the votes are tabu-
lated do party labels become relevant.5 5 The top vote-getter from each
party advances to the general election to face off, which makes the blan-
ket primary a partisan primary. 6 In the 2000 election, three states used
blanket primaries: California, Washington, and Alaska. 7
III. THE BLANKET PRIMARY TODAY
For almost seventy years, Washington's blanket primary enjoyed a
peaceful existence. The blanket primary did not come under fire until
California passed Proposition 198, an initiative that replaced California's
closed primary with a blanket primary. 58 Challengers to California's
adoption of a blanket primary succeeded not only in invalidating blanket
primaries with Jones, but also in closing Alaska's primary and persuad-
ing the Ninth Circuit to find Washington's blanket primary unconstitu-
tional in Reed.5 9 Because the Court in Reed relied so heavily on the rea-
47. ADRIAN & FINE, supra note 9, at 154.
48. JEWELL & MOREHOUSE, supra note 17, at 104.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 103.







58. Proposition 198 provided that "[a]ll persons entitled to vote, including those not affiliated
with any political party, shall have the right to vote ... for any candidate regardless of the candi-
date's political affiliation." Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 570 (2000).
59. The Alaska legislature passed a bill enacting a blanket primary in 1966. Although the pri-
mary had withstood attack in 1996, it was ultimately deemed unconstitutional as a result of the Jones
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soning in Jones, understanding the demise of Washington's primary re-
quires an examination of the rise and fall of California's blanket primary.
A. Jones: The Death Knellfor the Blanket Primary
In California Democratic Party v. Jones, the Supreme Court dis-
agreed with the Ninth Circuit and invalidated California's blanket pri-
mary, a decision that would prove lethal to the blanket primary system.6°
Four political parties with rules prohibiting voters not registered with the
party from voting in the parties' primaries brought suit against the Cali-
fornia Secretary of State for injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging
that Proposition 198 was a facially unconstitutional violation of their
right to free association, and the Supreme Court ultimately agreed.6' The
district court found for the Secretary of State; and its reasoning offers a
compelling analysis of the extent to which political parties can fairly be
viewed as private organizations, the extent to which the blanket primary
facilitates crossover voting, and the way in which the blanket primary
cures voter disenfranchisement.
62
The district court first acknowledged that that political parties'
freedom to associate is constitutionally protected.63 Generally, freedom
of association stems from the First Amendment's guarantee of free
speech because association advances ideas and beliefs.64 This freedom
encompasses association with partisan political organizations and affords
party members the right to associate only with those who share their po-
litical views.65 The district court in Jones recognized that an important
corollary of this freedom of association is the freedom not to associate,
that is, to exclude.
66
Thus, political parties, much like private organizations, have the
power to define their membership and to nominate candidates. 67 How-
ever, the district court in Jones refused to hold that this right was limit-
less. 68 To do so, the district court noted, would lead to the absurd result
decision because the Alaska primary was indistinguishable from the California primary.
O'Callaghan v. Director of Elections, 6 P.3d 728, 730 (Alaska 2000).
60. While California referred to the new primary as an open primary, the Supreme Court in
Jones correctly identified the new system as a blanket primary because it allowed all eligible voters
to vote for any candidate, regardless of party affiliation. See Jones, 530 U.S. at 570.
61. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 984 F. Supp. 1288, 1292 (E.D. Cal. 1997); Jones, 530 U.S.
at 586.
62. See Jones, 984 F. Supp. 1288.
63. Id. at 1293.
64. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208, 214-15 (1986).
65. Id.
66. Jones, 530 U.S. at 574.
67. Id.
68. Jones, 984 F. Supp. at 1295.
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of barring the state from requiring that all eligible voters be permitted to
vote in primary elections. 69 Rather, the district court held that the analogy
between political parties and private organizations is "imperfect at best"
because political parties do not embody the unity of most organizations;
they cannot compel voters to take oaths, pay dues, or to attend meetings
in order to vote in primary elections.70 Instead, the court stated that par-
ties are more analogous to government because they exert influence over
government and perform governmental functions. 71 Parties' First
Amendment freedom of association right, then, is not dispositive of the
constitutionality of the blanket primary because the primary is more of a
governmental function than a purely private process. 72 On this basis the
district court refused to hold rule Proposition 198 unconstitutional on its
face as a violation of the First Amendment's freedom to associate.73
The Jones district court also addressed whether blanket primaries
violated the freedom to associate in practice. It asked whether the burden
of the blanket primary law was severe, and if so, it asked whether the
blanket primary supported important government objectives. 74 First to
decide what level of scrutiny to apply, the district court was required to
determine how burdensome Proposition 198 was on the parties' associa-
tion right. 75 The court rejected the parties' arguments that the blanket
primary severely burdens parties' First Amendment association right
merely because it encourages crossover voting, a phenomenon where a
person not associated with a party votes in that party's primary.7 6 It ex-
plained that blanket primary laws are not severe because blanket prima-
ries do not increase the prevalence of party raiding, the most egregious
type of crossover voting. 77 In reaching this conclusion, the court distin-
guished between three different motivations behind crossover voting:
sincerity, strategy, and raiding.78
Sincere voting occurs when a voter not affiliated with a party never-
theless votes for a candidate from that party because she genuinely wants
that candidate to win the election. 9 Strategic voting occurs when a voter
not affiliated with a party nevertheless votes for a candidate from that
party because she believes the candidate she genuinely wants to win will
69. Id.




74. Id. at 1297.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1297-98.
78. Id. at 1297.
79. Id.
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not be successful and therefore chooses the candidate as a backup to her
first choice. 80 Finally, raiding occurs when a voter not affiliated with the
party nevertheless votes for a candidate from that party because she be-
lieves that candidate will be too weak to win in the general election
against her preferred candidate from another party. 81 Raiding was the
only crossover voting of concern in this context.
In assessing the threat of party raiding, the court was persuaded by
the "almost unanimity" among experts, who agree that party raiding is
not a realistic threat under blanket primaries. 82 To the extent that "be-
nevolent" crossover voting occurs, it affects not the outcome of an elec-
tion but the margin of victory. 83 Even accepting that crossover voting
might one day determine the outcome of an election and that the burden
to parties' association right was more than negligible, the court held that
the burden was not severe.84 At most, the opinion suggests, the burdens
imposed by a blanket primary are no more severe than those characteris-
tic of an open primary.85
Next, finding that the burden on parties' right to associate was not
severe, the court required that the state prove that the blanket primary
advance important governmental objectives.86 The state's sundry justifi-
cations for the law were all premised upon the belief that a blanket pri-
mary system leads to the election of candidates who are more representa-
tive of the electorate because it enfranchises "two types of arguably 'dis-
enfranchised' voters-independents and minority party voters in safe
districts."8 7 The court accepted the argument that representativeness and
democracy are both served by the blanket primary system because it
forces candidates to cater to a wider cross section of the electorate and
because it increases voter participation.88 Ultimately the court held that
blanket primaries were not facially constitutional, and that the burden of
blanket primary laws was not a severe burden to political parties; even if
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1297.
83. Id. at 1298.
84. Id. at 1299-1300.
85. Id. at 1300.
86. Id. at 1301.
87. The court also noted that the defendants argued that blanket primaries afford voters more
privacy, a justification the court admitted does not square perfectly with the representativeness ar-
gument. Id. at 1303; Minority party voters in safe districts are those voters who are in an area where
a party with which they are not affiliated is dominant to such a degree that the primary election
determines the outcome of the general election as a practical matter. Id. at 1301.
88. See id. at 1301-1302.
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severe, the law supported important governmental objectives. 89 The
Ninth Circuit agreed. 90
Jones was eventually appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
which reversed both the district and circuit court decisions. 91 Unlike the
district court, the Supreme Court found that the blanket primary law must
withstand strict scrutiny because it characterized the burden on parties'
association right as severe. 92 The Supreme Court began with a discussion
of the importance of political parties' First Amendment right to exclude,
holding that Proposition 198 contravenes this right because it "forces
political parties to associate with-to have their nominees, and hence
their positions, determined by-those who, at best, have refused to affili-
ate with the party, and, at worst, have expressly affiliated with a rival. 93
As support, the Supreme Court referred to the fact that in some primary
races, votes totaled more than twice the number of registered party mem-
bers.94 The Court concluded that the effect of these non-party votes
would ultimately change the message and direction of the party and was
thus severe.95 Because the Court "c[ould] think of no heavier burden on a
political party's associational freedom," it required that the blanket pri-
mary survive strict scrutiny. 96 Proposition 198 failed strict scrutiny be-




90. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed and adopted the opinion of the district
court. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 169 F.3d 646, 647-648 (9th Cir. 1999).
91. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 586 (2000).
92. Id. at 582.
93. Id. at 574, 577.
94. Id. at 578.
95. Id. at 579.
96. Id. at 582.
97. According to the Court, the first two interests, producing more representative candidates
and freeing political debates from partisan constraints, amounted to nothing more than a desire to
facilitate election of candidates that the party would not otherwise choose for itself. The third inter-
est, enfranchising voters, was dismissed, in part, as a matter of semantics. The Court rebuffed the
notion that terming voters who ascribe to minority parties or no party at all as "disenfranchised"
could refute the legal principle that a party's interest in defining its own members trumps the inter-
ests of nonmembers who wish to participate in party functions. The solution to this perceived disen-
franchisement, the Court said, is simply to join the party. The Court implied that the remaining state
interests in fairness, voter choice, voter participation, and voter privacy might be compelling in
another context, but not under the circumstances of this case. Even accepting the argument that
denying "disenfranchised" voters the opportunity to participate is unfair, the Court held that it would
be "less unfair than permitting non-party members to hijack the party." Increasing voter choice was
not served by the adoption of a blanket primary because the system encourages candidates to be-
come more centrist, thereby decreasing voters' choices. The blanket system only provides more
choices for those among the majority. Finally, the Court deemed that interests in retaining private
voters' party affiliations is not compelling, as evidenced by the fact that appointment to certain of-
fices requires disclosure of party affiliation. See id. at 582-85.
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Even having found no compelling state interest, the Court consid-
ered whether the blanket primary laws were narrowly tailored to the state
interest and concluded that they were not.98 The Court concluded that a
nonpartisan primary would serve the state's interests without imposing
severe burdens on political parties' freedom of association right.99 The
Jones decision left little hope that Washington's primary could survive
because Washington's primary was technically considered a blanket pri-
mary rather than a nonpartisan primary.
B. Washington's Blanket Primary
Washington's blanket primary is a legislative enactment, but there
are indications that voters overwhelmingly approved of the method for
selecting party candidates. In 1907, the Washington State legislature re-
placed the state's convention system for nominating candidates with an
open primary.' 00 The system required voters to publicly declare their
party affiliation to receive a ballot.' 10 Washington had been a heavily
Republican state until the adoption of the blanket primary, with Democ-
rats occupying only ten percent of the legislature's seats between 1914
and 1930.102 In 1921, the state legislature moved to close the state's pri-
mary, adopting a law requiring voters to declare their party affiliation at
the time of registration. °3 Voters overwhelmingly defeated this meas-
ure. 04 In 1934, organizations including the Washington State Grange
proposed an initiative to change the state's nomination process from an
open primary to a blanket primary.105 The legislature adopted the pro-
posal, and the blanket primary became law in 1935.106 The proposal was
never subject to a vote, but the fervor with which the party registration
requirement was rejected suggests that voters would have given their
approval to a blanket primary.'0 7 Washington State Grange signature
gatherers garnered more than the requisite number of signatures in sup-
98. Id.
99. Id. at 585-86; see supra Part lI.C.
100. WASHINGTON SECRETARY OF STATE, HISTORY OF THE BLANKET PRIMARY IN
WASHINGTON, http://www.secstate.wa.gov/electionsbphistory.aspx (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
101. Id.
102. POLITICAL LIFE IN WASHINGTON: GOVERNING THE EVERGREEN STATE 8 (Thor Swanson,
et al. eds., 1985)
103. WASHINGTON SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 100.
104. 60,593 peopled voted in favor, and 164,004 voted against. Id.
105. Id. The Washington State Grange professes to be a non-partisan group that advocates
agricultural and rural issues. WASHINGTON STATE GRANGE, http://www.wa-grange.org (last visited
Jan. 25, 2005).
106. WASHINGTON SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 100.
107. Id.
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port of the proposal in just one day, demonstrating the extent to which
Washington voters supported the adoption of the blanket primary.'
0 8
C. Precursors to Democratic Party of Washington State v. Reed
In spite of this indication that voters favored the blanket primary
whereby voters choose among all available candidates without regard for
party affiliation, the law was immediately challenged, but upheld, in
Anderson v. Millikin.10 9 The Washington Supreme Court emphasized the
absence of the notion of political parties in the Constitution:
The people in adopting the Constitutions, both state and federal,
wisely considered that political parties are evanescent things, born
of political emotions and of uncertain-sometimes precarious-
tenure of life, and went no further than to protect the elector in his
right to cast a ballot; not a coerced party ballot, but for the candidate
of his choice, whether he be upon one ballot or another
.... Political parties being neither mentioned, protected, nor fa-
vored in the Constitution, a law will not be held to be unconstitu-
tional, although in its workings it may destroy these organiza-
tions. 10
Conceding that parties do have some inherent rights, the court nev-
ertheless upheld the blanket primary law, holding that it did not violate
any of these inherent rights.' The state's first blanket primary occurred
just months after the Anderson decision.
11 2
After this early defeat, foes of the blanket primary remained vigi-
lant. In 1964 and 1966, the Republican and Democratic Parties, respec-
tively, proposed overhauling the blanket primary in favor of an open
primary. 113 In 1979, the Senate conducted hearings on alternatives to the
blanket primary. 14
The biggest attack to blanket primaries in Washington came in
1980 with Heavey v. Chapman. 5 The earlier case of Anderson was not
dispositive of the constitutional issues in Heavey because the Supreme
Court of Washington had since articulated a constitutional right to free-
108. WASHINGTON SECRETARY OF STATE, CHARLES W. HODDE: MR. SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE,
Vol. 1 and 2 (1985, 1986), available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/elections/bp hodde.aspx (last
visited Oct. 9, 2004) [hereinafter HODDE].
109. 186 Wash. 602, 59 P.2d 295 (1936).
110. Id. at 606, 59 P.2d at 297 (citing State ex rel. Shepard v. Superior Court, 60 Wash. 370,
380, 111 P. 233, 238 (1910)).
111. These include the right to adopt principles, the right to require members to adhere to those
principles, and the right to expel officials who contravene those principles. Id.
112. HODDE, supra note 108.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 93 Wash. 2d 700, 611 P.2d 1256 (1980).
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dom of association.' 16 In Heavey, the political party-plaintiffs were first
required to prove that the law was a substantial burden to their right of
association, and the state-defendant would be required to prove that the
blanket primary was narrowly tailored to advance compelling state inter-
ests. I7
The plaintiffs were unable to meet this burden because of the secret
nature of state ballots.1 18 While acknowledging that the plaintiffs' burden
was difficult to meet, the court chastised the plaintiffs for refusing to
even attempt to show that they had suffered some injury." 9 However, the
court indicated that the plaintiffs might not have prevailed even if they
had been able to prove that the blanket primary permitted crossover vot-
ing:
A state may legislate to prevent the perceived evils of crossover vot-
ing, but several states permit crossover voting in their primaries.
Others have provision[s] for primaries which allow participation by
independents and members of other parties. There is no suggestion
that such a clause makes the election laws unconstitutional, nor is it
a mandatory prerequisite to constitutionality that independent, non-
member electors be permitted to vote in a party's primary.
120
Moreover, the court suggested that the right of association is not
limitless and would only be recognized insofar as it could be used to in-
validate a law that was either racially discriminatory or impeded voter
participation, neither of which was alleged by the plaintiffs. 21 Thus, the
issue was put to rest in Washington, but Jones reinvigorated the issue for
those opposed to the Washington primary.
D. Democratic Party of Washington State v. Reed
After the Supreme Court's decision in Jones, the Democratic Party
of Washington State filed suit in federal district court against Washing-
ton Secretary of State Sam Reed. 122 The Democratic Party sought a de-
claratory judgment that Washington's blanket primary was unconstitu-
tional because it does not advance a compelling state interest, or even if
the blanket primary does assert a compelling state interest, there are less
116. Id. at 702, 611 P.2d at 1257.
1 17. See id.
118. Id. at 703, 611 P.2d at 1258.
119. See id.
120. Id. (citing Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837, 850 (D. Conn. 1976)) (internal citations
omitted).
121. Id.
122. Democratic Party v. Reed, No. C005419FDB 4 (W.D. Wash. filed Mar. 27, 2002), avail-
able at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/office/bp/bpopinionfull.pdf.
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restrictive means of doing SO. 12 3 The party also sought an injunction al-
lowing it to restrict participation in partisan primaries. 124 The Republican
and Libertarian Parties intervened as plaintiffs. 125 The Washington State
Grange, a key player in the adoption of the blanket primary in 1935, in-
tervened as a defendant.126 The parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. 1
27
The district court granted the Secretary of State's motion to dismiss
the claim, finding that Washington's blanket primary was constitu-
tional. 128 The court held that Jones was inapplicable because there were
material differences between the California and Washington blanket pri-
maries and because the parties could not prove that their association right
was substantially burdened by Washington's blanket primary.1
29
The district court distinguished the California and Washington sys-
tems on five different grounds. First, the systems were distinguishable
because California required that voters register their party affiliation,
while Washington did not. 30 Second, the California primary placed more
emphasis on party affiliation, requiring that candidates demonstrate three
months of continuous registration for the party whose nomination they
were seeking.' 3' Washington, on the other hand, freely allowed candi-
dates to indicate party affiliation, if applicable. 3 2 Third, the court charac-
terized Washington's primary as akin to a nonpartisan primary. 33 Rather
than sending the top two vote-getters to the general election, candidates
receiving at least one percent of the vote for that office and a plurality of
the votes for their parties proceed to the general election. 34 Washing-
ton's primary thus prevented a general election runoff between two
members of the same party. Fourth, the adoption of the blanket primary
in Washington differed from the adoption of Proposition 198 in Califor-
nia. 35 Washington's blanket primary was adopted by the legislature,
whereas California's blanket primary was enacted through a voter initia-
123. Id.
124. Reed, 343 F.3d at 1201.
125. Id.
126. Id.; see supra Part III.B.
127. Reed, No. C005419FDB at 3.
128. Id. at 28.
129. Id. at 8-10, 13.
130. Id. at9.
131. Id. at 10.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 11.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1- 12.
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tive. 136 Thus, the Washington primary is authorized by the Elections
Clause, which vests powers over elections in state legislatures.
137
Finally, the court distinguished the purposes behind the California
and Washington laws. The purpose of the California primary was to
"'weaken' party 'hard-liners' and ease the way for 'moderate problem-
solvers."''1 38 In contrast, Washington's blanket primary was enacted "to
allow [a]ll properly registered voters [to] vote for their choice at any
primary election, for any candidate for each office regardless of political
affiliation and without a declaration of political faith or adherence on the
part of the voter.,
139
As in Heavey, the district court found that the political party-
plaintiffs could not provide evidence of a substantial burden on their as-
sociation right.140 The court came to this conclusion by exploring the ex-
tent to which non-party-members participate in party primaries.' 4' In
other words, the court looked for evidence of crossover voting.
The court was not persuaded by the plaintiffs' evidence of injury.142
The court deemed the evidence provided as a "mere assertion" that did
not show actual injury.1 43 Elected candidates remained committed to
party goals, voter loyalty to parties in Washington mimicked national
patterns, parties were still able to set their own agendas, parties were co-
hesive and maintained their own leadership hierarchies, and there was no
evidence of party raiding.144 Thus, finding no evidence of a substantial
burden on the parties' associational right, the court granted the Secretary
of State's motion to dismiss.
1 45
The political parties appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which acknowl-
edged the precedent set by Jones and concluded that resolution of the
case required only that the court determine whether the Washington State
136. Id. at 12.
137. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 602-603 (2000). The Elections Clause
provides as follows: "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Repre-
sentatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof." U.S. Const. art. I, §. 4, cl. 1.
138. Reed, No. C005419FDB at 13.
139. Id. (citing Heavey v. Chapman, 93 Wash. 2d 700, 705, 611 P.2d 1256, 1259 (1980)).
140. The court's discussion of certain evidentiary issues is excluded from this summary. See
Reed, No. C005419FDB at 14-23; Heavey, 93 Wash. 2d at 702, 611 P.2d at 1258.
141. Reed, No. C005419FDB at 24.
142. The Republican Party claimed to have been injured by Republican candidate Jennifer
Dunn's 1992 congressional campaign because of the way in which "she sought broad support" from
primary voters. Having no evidence from which to conclude that Republican voters in Dunn's dis-
trict did not truly want her to win, the court disregarded this evidence. Similarly, the Democratic
Party argued that the nomination of gubernatorial candidate Dixy Lee Ray resulted from crossover
voting. Id. at 27-28.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 24-26.
145. Id. at 29.
[Vol. 29:449
Why Blanket Primaries are Constitutional
blanket primary was distinguishable from the California primary, which
was invalidated in Jones.146 The Secretary of State argued that the Cali-
fornia primary was distinguishable in two respects.1 47 First, California
registers voter affiliation, but Washington does not. 148 The court dis-
missed this argument by noting that the fact that Washington voters are
not required to formally proclaim party affiliation does not mean that
they lack party affiliation. 49 Thus, the court permitted parties to exclude
voters not explicitly affiliated with the party even though Washington
does not require voters to declare their affiliations. 50
The State also lost its argument that Washington's primary is non-
partisan because Washington State lacks a party registration scheme' 5'
and Washington voters do not elect party nominees. 52 The court dis-
missed this argument as "the problem with the system, not a defense of
it. , 153 In the court's view, Washington's primary impermissibly pre-
vented parties from selecting their nominees. 154 It stated that the First
Amendment's freedom of association guarantee applies to parties and
ensures them the freedom not to associate with nonparty members 155
Having found the Washington primary "materially indistinguish-
able" from California's blanket primary, the court proceeded to strictly
scrutinize the law.' 56 The court ultimately found no compelling state in-
terest to support the primary law's facial constitutional burden on parties'
First Amendment rights. 57 Stating that Jones was dispositive of all of
Washington's interests, it struck down Washington's blanket primary by
analogizing each of the State's arguments to Jones and summarily dis-
missing them. 1
58
146. Democratic Party of Wash. State v. Reed, 343 F.3d 1198, 1203 (9th Cir. 2003). The in-
ability to demonstrate a substantial burden that proved to be fatal for the plaintiffs in Heavey and
Reed was of no concern to the court because, as was the case in Jones, the burden could be inferred
from the face of the blanket primary law. In other words, the court did not require evidence that the
parties' rights had actually been burdened. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1203-04.
150. Id. at 1204.
151. Id. at 1203.
152. Id.





158. The State first argued that the law promoted fairness by empowering all voters to partici-
pate in all stages of candidate selection. Employing the language from Jones, the court held that "a
nonmember's desire to participate in the party's affairs is overborne by the countervailing and le-
gitimate right of the party to determine its own membership qualifications." The State's second
argument, that the primary maximizes voter choice, was also rejected because, as was said in Jones,
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The district court decision in favor of Washington State was re-
versed. 9 The defendants appealed, and the Supreme Court denied cer-
tiorari twice.' 60 Thus, Reed successfully invalidated blanket primaries in
Washington State.
E. The Aftermath of Reed
In response to the invalidation of the blanket primary, the Washing-
ton State Legislature debated whether to replace the old system with a
ballot modeled after either Montana or Louisiana.' 6 1 The Montana-style
primary is an open primary in which voters privately choose one party's
ballot. 162 The Louisiana-style primary is nonpartisan and would allow
voters to vote for any candidate, much like they had in the blanket pri-
mary, except that the top two vote-getters would advance to the general
election, regardless of party affiliation. 163 It was billed as the "modified
blanket primary" because, from voters' perspectives, it would mimic the
blanket primary. 164 Washington Secretary of State Sam Reed supported
such an interest "is hardly a compelling state interest, if indeed it is even a legitimate one." The third
state interest, protecting voter privacy, was not considered compelling in Jones, and was particularly
worthy of rejection here because the state broadly protects voter privacy only in general elections,
which are distinguishable from primaries. The fourth interest, increasing voter participation, was
essentially rejected because the increased participation results only from producing candidates that
cater to majoritarian, rather than partisan, concerns. Later in the opinion, the court also addressed the
Grange's arguments that the blanket primary affords voters a scheme for voting on the basis of is-
sues that do not fall along party lines. The court rejected this argument as an attempt to force parties
to nominate more majoritarian candidates who appeal to the entire electorate but not to party mem-
bers. The remedy for such voters, according to the court, is to vote for a different candidate rather
than to participate in determining who will carry the party's message. The court rejected the State's
fifth interest, preserving state sovereignty in determining how state elections are held, as being insuf-
ficiently specific to warrant designation as compelling. While recognizing that states have the power
to determine time, place, and manner requirements, the court rejected the notion that those restric-
tions could be employed to impede fundamental rights. Id. at 1205-1207 (citing Jones, 530 U.S. at
583, 584).
159. Id. at 1207.
160. Reed v. Democratic Party of Wash., 540 U.S. 1213 (2004); Wash. State Grange v. Wash.
State Democratic Party, 541 U.S. 957 (2004).
161. See Garber, supra, note 3.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. WASHINGTON SECRETARY OF STATE, MODIFIED BLANKET PRIMARY PASSES STATE
SENATE ENGROSSED SENATE BILL 6453: ENACTING A QUALIFYING PRIMARY (2004),
http://www.secstate.wa.gov/office/ososnews.aspx?i=r769biUPmkgydz5MqKoZhA%3d%3d (last
visited Nov. 20, 2004).
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this proposal.165 The Secretary of State's website also published polls
indicating a clear voter preference for the nonpartisan primary.1
66
Nonetheless, Washington politicians sharply criticized the nonparti-
san primary on several bases. They argued that a nonpartisan primary
deprives voters of some choice because they may be forced to pick be-
tween candidates from the same party in the general election. 67 Gover-
nor Gary Locke, one of the nonpartisan primary's vocal critics, claimed
that Washington voters would have been forced to choose between two
Democratic gubernatorial candidates in the general elections of 1980 and
1996. 168 Of 627 races between 1993 and 2003, the Secretary of State's
office found twenty-five races in which two candidates of the same party
would have faced off in the general election if the nonpartisan primary
had been in effect at the time. 69 It also argued that voters may also be
deprived of choices because the nonpartisan primary effectively excludes
minor parties.
170
Another criticism leveled against the nonpartisan primary was that
it places more emphasis on the primary election, where voter participa-
tion is much lower.' 7' Under the nonpartisan system, the primary can
take on more importance because it might decisively exclude one
party. 172 In Washington, voter turnout in the primaries of 2000 and 2002
was about half of the turnout in the general elections. 7 3 This is problem-
atic if low voter turnout results in skewed voter representation.
7 4
The second alternative considered, the nonpartisan model in Lou-
isiana, has reportedly contributed to some unusual results. It encourages
candidates to enter races solely to draw votes away from disliked candi-
165. WASHINGTON SECRETARY OF STATE, REED PROPOSES MODIFIED BLANKET PRIMARY
(2004), http://www.secstate.wa.gov/office/osos-news.aspx?i=oecMziGTVNQND%2fLeK77]NA%3
d%3d (last visited Nov. 20, 2004).
166. WASHINGTON SECRETARY OF STATE, VOTERS SUPPORT A QUALIFYING (MODIFIED
BLANKET) PRIMARY (Feb. 2004), http://www.secstate.wa.gov/office/news-docs/Voters%20support
%20a%20modified%20blanket%20primary.pdf.
167. See Andrew Garber, Veto Overhauls State Primaries with Montana-Style System,
SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 2, 2004, at B1.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Susan Gilmore, Primary Backlash Fuels Drive for 1-872, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 15, 2004,
at B1.
171. Gary Locke, Editorial, Voter Choice the Primary Consideration, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr.
18, 2004, at D1.
172. See id. "[V]oter turnout tends to be depressed for the runoffs." Jacobson, supra note 38, at
2894.
173. See Locke, supra note 170.
174. Id.
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dates. 175 Some argue that this has facilitated the election of extremists,
such as the election of white supremacist David Duke.
176
Washington's Democratic and Republican Parties bitterly opposed
adoption of the nonpartisan primary. They argued that, like the blanket
primary, the nonpartisan ballot would deprive them of the power to
choose their own candidates. 177 If the nonpartisan primary were adopted,
the two major parties pledged to revert back to the convention model of
candidate nomination, a system that had not been used in the state since
1907.178 The Democratic and Republican Party chairs supported the veto
and the Montana-style open primary. 179
The nonpartisan system had some success in Washington. On
March 2, 2004, the Washington State Senate passed a bill replacing the
blanket primary with a nonpartisan primary in a twenty-eight to twenty
vote. 180 In a move that would prove to be significant, the House passed a
modified version.181 The house added a fallback provision, requiring the
adoption of the Montana-style primary in the event that the nonpartisan
primary was invalidated by the courts. 182 This version passed the Senate
and reached Governor Locke's desk. 1
83
Governor Locke voiced disapproval of the nonpartisan system.
1 4
The modified House version gave him the perfect opportunity to show
his disapproval; rather than veto the entire bill, the Governor was able to
veto parts establishing the nonpartisan primary. The parts establishing
the Montana-style system, the provision that was intended to operate as a
backup measure, remained unchanged. 185 In Governor Locke's view, the
way the bill was written implied that the legislature desired this type of
veto. 186 According to Governor Locke, "In the last days of the session
there were many legislators who came up and said, 'Do you know how
we wrote this?' They indicated that while they voted for the bill, they
would not be at all displeased if I vetoed out [the Louisiana system].' 87
175. Jacobson, supra note 39, at 2894.
176. Experts believe that white supremacist David Duke was able to secure a seat in Louisi-
ana's House of Representatives because of the nonpartisan structure of Louisiana's elections. Id.
177. Garber, supra note 167.
178. Id.; HODDE, supra note 108.
179. Garber, supra note 167.
180. HODDE, supra note 108.
181. Garber, supra note 167.
182. Id.
183. David Ammons, Locke Vetoes "Top-2" Primary, Creates Separate Party Voting,
SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 1, 2004, at B4.
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His decision was also guided by the belief that the parties would have
inevitably challenged the nonpartisan system.
188
The resulting ballot, used in the 2003 primary, was an open primary
allowing voters to declare their party affiliation secretly. Under the new
system, not only were voters required to vote for the candidates of a sin-
gle party, but they also had to declare their party preference in order for
their votes to count. 189 To appear on the primary ballot, parties must have
received more than five percent of the vote.' 90 To advance to the general
election, candidates must have received at least one percent of the vote in
the primary. 191
Voter response to the new primary was robust. In one twenty-four
hour period, the Secretary of State's office received 2000 phone calls and
one email every two minutes. 192 Secretary of State Sam Reed estimated
that only about five percent of phone calls from voters were positive and
that his office had received 2000 angry emails.
193
While the Montana-style primary appeared to be a clear win for
Washington's political parties, it is not entirely clear that political parties
agreed.1 94 While the Democratic Party clearly approved of the veto, they
preferred that Washington voters also be required to register their party
affiliation publicly. 95 The Washington State Grange, the organization
that helped to spearhead the enactment of the blanket primary in Wash-
ington and defend its constitutionality, was also disappointed by the
adoption of the new system.19 6 In response, the Grange launched a two-
front attack. First, the Grange filed an ultimately unsuccessful lawsuit
against Governor Locke, challenging the constitutionality of his creative
188. Id.
189. Ammons, supra note 183.
190. Nick Perry, Libertarians See Potential Gain in Contested Primary, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept.
11, 2004, at B4.
191. Id.
192. Susan Gilmore, Voter's Upset Over New Primary, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 26, 2004, at B 1.
193. Id.
194. "'We think it was a very positive step for him to veto (the Top Two),' said Paul Berendt,
chairman of the state Democratic Party." Garber, supra note 166.
195. Ammons, supra note 183.
196. Chad Johnson, Grange Fights Locke's Primary Veto, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 23, 2004, at
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veto. 197 Second, it worked, via Initiative 872, to reinstate the blanket
primary in a modified form. 98
If voter support for the initiative can be viewed as any indication of
voter response to the Reed decision, the results clearly indicate voter dis-
approval of Reed.199 The measure was decisively victorious, garnering
59.84% of the vote. 200 The measure gained voter approval both statewide
and in each of Washington's thirty-nine counties.20 1 Not to be outdone by
the will of the people, the major political parties successfully challenged
the constitutionality of the nonpartisan primary in federal district
court;20 2 the decision has been appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
20 3
IV. BLANKET PRIMARIES ARE CONSTITUTIONAL
AND ARE SUPPORTED BY PUBLIC POLICY
The Ninth Circuit in Reed erroneously assumed that
Jones mandated the invalidation of all blank primaries.20 4 Washington
had adhered to the blanket primary system for decades, so some voter
resentment was to be expected. At a deeper level, the invalidation of
Washington's blanket primary is open to criticism because it was prem-
ised on a fundamental disregard for Washington's unique political land-
scape, the place of the primary in that landscape, and a method for select-
ing party candidates that, through a blanket primary, was constitutional.
Beyond Reed and the Washington context, there are many fea-
tures inherent in the blanket primary system that suggest that the Su-
preme Court in Jones erred in ruling it unconstitutional. The blanket pri-
mary affords a maximum amount of voter choice, allowing voters of all
affiliations equal levels of participation, regardless of whether "their"
party is offering a competitive slate of candidates. 20 5 The blanket primary
recognizes that political parties are not entitled to all of the protections
197. Wash. State Grange v. Locke, 153 Wash. 2d 475, 105 P.3d 9 (2005). The court upheld the
veto because it applied to entire sections, because Governor Locke's expression of his understanding
of the meaning of one of the sections he decided not to veto did not amount to an attempt to rewrite
it, because the title of the bill passed muster under Article II, § 19 of the Washington State Constitu-
tion, and because the veto need not be subjected to an Article II, § 83 analysis, which applies only to
amendments.
198. Gilmore, supra note 170.
199. See WASHINGTON SECRETARY OF STATE, INITIATIVE MEASURE 872-ELECTION FOR




202. Wash. State Republican Party v. Logan, 377 F. Supp. 2d 907, 912 (W.D. Wash. 2005).
203. Wash. State Republican Party v. Logan, 2005 WL 1667774, *3 (W.D. Wash. 2005), ap-
peal docketed, NO. C 05-CV-927 (9th Cir. Aug. 4, 2005).
204. Infra Part IV.A.
205. Infra Part IV.C-D.
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that the First Amendment affords private organizations. Furthermore, it
assigns great importance to the primary stage, deviating from acceptance
that primaries are less important to voters than general elections.
20 6
Moreover, while the level of openness of blanket primaries may expose
the parties to a greater risk of party raiding than other primary systems,
no system can truly stop party raiding; in fact, the threat of party raiding
is more imagined than real.20 7 The following sections detail why the Reed
court was wrong and why blanket primaries in Washington are constitu-
tional and supported by public policy.
A. Jones did not Invalidate All Blanket Primaries
The premise of the Reed court's invalidation of Washington's blan-
ket primary was that Jones was dispositive. However, the court failed to
appreciate the material distinction between California and Washington
primary elections. That both states employed primaries properly charac-
terized as "blanket primaries" does not necessitate identical conclusions
of non-constitutionality; a blanket primary may still pass constitutional
muster. The district court properly recognized five points of distinction
between the two states' primaries, but the state argued only one of the
two most important distinctions to the Ninth Circuit. 20 8 The interplay be-
tween these two distinctions most clearly illustrates how Washington's
primary elections were unique and distinguishable from California's, and
thus shows why Jones did not apply in the Washington context.
The State argued in Reed that the systems differ because California
voters register their party affiliation, but Washington voters do not.20 9
The result of this nonpartisan registration, according to the State, is that
the election itself is nonpartisan. In other words, the election serves to
elect nominees who represent the electorate at large rather than a party.
210
Even if voters do not register their party affiliation, according to the
court, they still have some party affiliation and presumably vote in ac-
cordance with it.
2 11
This aspect of the court's opinion directly conflicts with the lan-
guage in Jones. The Jones Court delineated a primary system that would
constitutionally preserve the openness of the blanket system: a nonparti-
san primary.21 2 The crucial feature of this type of primary, according to
the Jones Court, is that voters are not choosing the party's nominee be-
206. Infra Part IV.D.
207. Infra Part IV.E.
208. See Democratic Party of Wash. v. Reed, 343 F.3d 1198, 1203 (9th Cir. 2003).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1203-04.
212. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 585 (2000).
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cause that would violate the right to freedom of association. 2  This is
precisely the argument the court rejected in Reed.2 14 If the State had also
argued the second key feature of Washington's primary system that
makes it critically different from California's, that candidates are not re-
quired to demonstrate strict party adherence, the Court might not have
concluded that Washingtonian voting patterns are likely to be partisan.
Although the court may have been correct in concluding that
merely because Washington voters do not register party affiliation does
not mean that their votes are nonpartisan, this conclusion fails to consider
that candidates running for office in Washington are not required to meet
strict registration requirements.2t 5 In California, candidates are required
to continuously register for their party for three months in order to qual-
ify to be placed on their party's ballot.216 In Washington, candidates self-
declare their party affiliation; 21 7 there is no requirement that candidates in
Washington be true party adherents. In a sense, the Washington declara-
tion of party affiliation is more an informational tool for voters than it is
a sign of commitment to the party.
Thus, candidates in Washington do not need to demonstrate any
level of commitment to "their" party, and the state's argument that
Washington primary winners are nominees of the electorate rather than
of "their" party is an accurate description of Washington's blanket pri-
mary. Granted, this may be a rather unorthodox approach to primary
elections, but that alone does not justify invalidating it. It may be that
seventy years ago Washington's legislators figured out something that
the courts and the rest of the states are still loathe to admit: Primary elec-
tions are too important to be treated like party pageants dominated by
party rules. As the district court in Reed recognized, that an election in-
volves party labels does not mean that the election itself is partisan or
that primary winners can fairly be characterized as representing only
their declared parties. 21 8 Only by engaging in a state-specific inquiry into
the meaning of partisanship can the constitutionality of a state's blanket
primary system be accurately evaluated.
B. Political Parties are not Purely Private Organizations
The premise of any political party's attack of a state's primary sys-
tem is the notion that the political party's right to free association entitles
213. Id. at 586.
214. Reed, 343 F.3d at 1204.




218. Seeid. at9, 11.
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it to determine which voters can associate with the party.2 19 However,
political parties are not purely private organizations, so their associa-
tional right to exclude should not be viewed as absolute.22° Many politi-
cal party functions are private in nature, and therefore parties' First
Amendment right to associate would apply. Some examples of a party's
private practices are the decision to endorse particular candidates and
how to communicate the party's endorsements of those candidates.22'
When performing these functions, the party acts as a private organization
and is entitled to all of the First Amendment protections that come with
that status.222 These are mostly internal party functions.
However, the primary is entirely different from these "internal"
party functions; the primary is a public, state function.223 It is unlike any
other form of candidate nomination because it is actually an election.224
In these respects, the primary is more like a government function deserv-
ing of less First Amendment protection. In his Jones dissent, Justice Ste-
vens offered an extreme illustration of why parties' right not to associate
applies to internal party affairs but is not absolute in the primary process:
A political party could, if a majority of its members chose to do so,
adopt a platform advocating white supremacy and opposing the
election of any non-Caucasians. Indeed, it could decide to use its
funds and oratorical skills to support only those candidates who
were loyal to its racist views. Moreover, if a State permitted its po-
litical parties to select their candidates through conventions or cau-
cuses, a racist party would also be free to select only candidates
who would adhere to the party line .... It is because the primary is
state action that an organization-whether it calls itself a political
party or just a "Jaybird" association-may not deny non-Caucasians
the right to participate in the selection of its nominees.225
In a primary, a party cannot compel voters to take oaths, pay dues, or
attend meetings before being permitted to vote in primary elections, ef-
fectively rendering parties powerless to control who votes.226 Nonethe-
less, because primaries are elections, they have a high degree of state
involvement.227 This state involvement, including the financing of the
219. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 593 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see
also supra, Part III.A.
220. See supra, Part III.A.
221. See Jones, 530 U.S at 592.
222. See id
223. Id. at 594.
224. Id. at 594.
225. Id. at 592-594.
226. Id. at 596
227. Id. at 594.
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actual election, implicates state interests and demands that party interests
not be viewed as absolute.228 When viewed in this light, the concern that
the blanket primary system may infringe upon parties' right to associate
is an insufficient justification for deeming the blanket primary unconsti-
tutional.
C. The Forgotten Voter
Beyond the First Amendment, there are other public policy reasons
for supporting Washington's blanket primary model. Forgotten in any
discussion of the balance between state and party interests are minority
229 23023party, third party,  and independent voters.23' Only under a blanket
primary scheme are these voters afforded a meaningful voice. Under
other primary systems, these voters have no stake in the outcome of ma-
jor parties' political primaries because they are not formal members of
the parties.
Minority voters should be heard at the primary for four reasons.
First, the primary election may be determinative of the general election.
If two candidates of the same party are unopposed by candidates from
other parties, voters who are not members of the only party to offer can-
didates for the general election would be excluded unfairly from the elec-
tion that will ultimately determine the candidate who will represent them.
Although not all primary elections rise to this level of importance, the
risk that whole segments of the voting population could be disenfran-
chised in this way demands that the courts err on the side of inclusion
rather than exclusion.
Second, even if a primary technically offers candidates from at least
two parties, voters may perceive themselves as realistically having only
one clear choice. Such is the case when one party so clearly dominates a
region that candidates from other parties are considered nothing more
232than token opposition. For example, in a voting district that is histori-
cally overwhelmingly Democratic; the Republican, independent, and
third party voters would be denied the opportunity to participate in what
is, pragmatically speaking, the only primary that matters.
228. See id. at 595.
229. "Minority party" refers to those voters who adhere to a party that is so marginalized in
their voting district so as to have no viable chance of winning the election.
230. "Third party" refers to any party other than the Republican and Democratic parties.
231. "Independent voters" refers not to voters who tout themselves as being independent but
instead to those voters who do not adhere to one party.
232. "Voters who identify with the minority party may be less motivated to vote in the primary
if they assume that the eventual nominee has little chance of being elected because the majority party
dominates the elections." JEWELL & MOREHOUSE, note 17, at 126.
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Third, in a race between strong candidates from two opposing par-
ties, independents and third party voters should still be afforded a voice
in one of the major parties' primaries. Even if the primary offers inde-
pendent and third party candidates, it is realistic for potential voters to
view a vote for these candidates as a throwaway vote and to want to par-
ticipate in a primary that they perceive as actually affecting the general
election. Third party candidates can and do rob major candidates of im-
portant votes. In 1912, Theodore Roosevelt ran for President as a Pro-
gressive Party candidate, capturing twenty-seven percent of the votes and
securing Democrat Woodrow Wilson's election. 233 In 2000, Ralph Nader
ran for President as a Green Party candidate, siphoning critical votes
from Al Gore.234 To avoid this, third party adherents may choose to cast
their votes for a candidate from one of the major parties, and they should
be allowed to do so.
Finally, forcing voters to join the party of the primary in which they
235want to participate is not the answer. This proposed solution ignores
the possibility that in any given election, there may be a mixture of races
in which voters feel compelled to vote for major party candidates and
races in which minor party candidates are viable options. Also, even if
voters do vote for major party candidates in all races, they should still be
allowed to express their affiliation with a different party. 236
D. The Nonpartisan Primary Still Disenfranchises Voters
At first glance, a nonpartisan primary, which Washington voters se-
lected to replace the Montana-style primary that Governor Locke signed
into law, appears to cure voter disenfranchisement. This was the view of
the Supreme Court in Jones. In a situation in which the only candidates
running are from the same party, the nonpartisan primary is no worse
237than the Montana primary. In a sense, it is better because it allows
non-party members to participate. For example, suppose two Democrats
are running for governor. Under the Montana primary, Republican voters
would be barred from voting in the gubernatorial race unless they were
willing to vote for Democrats in all primary races because they would be
limited to the Democratic ballot.2 38 Under the nonpartisan primary, how-
233. SABATO & LARSON, supra note 7, at 29.
234. Id.
235. This was the Supreme Court's response to the argument in Jones that the blanket primary
enfranchised voters in a way that other primaries cannot. Jones, 530 U.S. at 584.
236. See supra Part IV.C.
237. The Montana-style primary is an open primary, which is described supra, Part II.C.
238. In fact, Republicans would also be required to check a box declaring Democratic affilia-
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ever, Republican voters could vote in the gubernatorial race without sac-
rificing votes for Republican candidates in other races.
However, in a nonpartisan primary race where there are candidates
representing both major parties, there is still the potential for voter disen-
franchisement. For example, in an overwhelmingly Republican district,
Democratic, independent, and third party voters will want to participate
in the Republican primary because they know it will ultimately deter-
mine the outcome of the general election; their non-Republican candi-
dates may be nothing more than token opposition. Under both the blanket
primary and the nonpartisan primary, voters of all parties would be al-
lowed to vote for one of the Republican candidates. 239 The difference
between the two primary systems is the impact that this openness at the
primary stage has on the general election. Under the blanket primary, the
Republican who received the most primary votes would advance to the
general election to compete against the highest vote-getter from the other
parties. Under the nonpartisan primary, though, the top two vote-
getters would advance, irrespective of their party affiliation. In other
words, there is no guarantee that unaffiliated voters and voters affiliated
with the minority party or a third party will have a candidate to represent
them at the general election. Under the nonpartisan primary, the price to
pay for having a voice in the race that will ultimately decide the winner
is surrendering the chance to vote for a candidate representing your party
in the general election.
One may argue that the right surrendered under the nonpartisan
primary is inconsequential. The motivation behind non-Republicans'
desire to participate in the Republican primary is that the district is so
dominated by Republicans that no other candidates stand a chance. Why,
then, should it matter whether other candidates are represented in the
general election? The reason is twofold.
First, minority party candidates may stand a better chance of win-
ning when the vote is no longer shared with another candidate from the
majority party. For example, imagine that the two Republican candidates
competing in the nonpartisan primary have vastly different political
agendas. Candidates running in the Republican-dominated district will be
encouraged to affiliate with the Republican Party to increase their
chances of winning. Candidates running on the Republican platform will
want to cater their message to attract non-Republican voters who have no
viable candidates to represent them. If both Republican candidates ad-
vance to the general election, they will compete for the remaining votes
that went to non-Republicans.
239. See supra Part II.C.
240. See supra Part II.C.
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A different outcome is likely under a blanket primary system. Ob-
viously, only one of the two Republicans will advance to the general
election. But what happens to all the primary votes that went to the los-
ing Republican candidate? It is too simplistic to suggest that they merely
transfer to the winning Republican candidate, ensuring her victory in the
general election. Some, or many, of those votes could go to non-
Republican candidates. What this means is that while non-majority can-
didates may be mere token opposition in the primary, they may serve as
viable opponents in the general election. The nonpartisan primary de-
prives non-majority voters of the opportunity to vote for their candidate
in the general election while also participating in the majority party's
primary. Ensuring that voters have the choice to exercise both options
gives them a voice in determining which candidate will ultimately repre-
sent them.
The second reason why these voters deserve to have their party af-
filiations represented in the general election is that it affords them an
avenue for political change. An election is about more than selecting a
candidate. It also sends a message from voters to majority party candi-
dates about how strong or weak the minority party is, and it forces them
to be accountable to not just their own party members, but their constitu-
ents as a whole. It tells parties whether they are succeeding at getting
their message out and reaching voters. Even if minority party voters
know that their candidate is going to lose at the general election, they
should have the chance to cast a vote for their candidate as a means of
expressing their values.
E. Party Raiding
One of the major concerns in Jones and Reed is that blanket prima-
ries allow raiders from other parties to crossover and change the values
and messages the party espouses. As the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
clearly indicates, one surefire way for state primary election laws to pass
muster is if they claim to prevent party raiding.24 Because the argument
that party raiding interferes with parties' association right is so univer-
sally accepted, it bears investigation.242
241. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 580 (2000). For example, the Supreme
Court in Jones was not persuaded by evidence that party raiding is unlikely and that even benevolent
crossover votes are unlikely to affect an election's results.
242. See, e.g., Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 760-762 (1973) (upholding New York's
registration scheme requiring voters to register party affiliation eight months before presidential
primaries and eleven months before non-presidential primaries because the requirement made party
raiding almost impossible).
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1. True Raiding is Unlikely
Party raiding does not justify abolishing blanket primaries because
raiding is unlikely to occur. While characterizing the motivations 243 be-
hind crossover votes is admittedly difficult, studies suggest that party
raiding simply does not occur.2 44 There was near unanimity among ex-
perts called to testify about this issue on behalf of both parties. 245 More-
over, some conclude that crossover voters "are rarely trying to pick a
weak candidate but usually support the candidate whose views or record
and personality are appealing to them. 246 Even the evidence that per-
suaded the Supreme Court in Jones does not clearly demonstrate the
presence of actual raiding.247 Merely because more voters voted in pri-
mary races than were actually registered as party members does not nec-
essarily mean that people were voting for the opposition.
Additionally, because raiding is so difficult and risky to accom-
plish, the excess votes are probably attributable to voters finally being
free to cast sincere crossover votes for their preferred candidates irre-
spective of party designations. When voters cross over to the other
party's race, they sacrifice votes for their own party's candidate. Thus,
people who cross over are more likely to vote for a candidate they would
actually like to see in office, even if only as their second choice. In other
words, these crossover votes are probably sincere.
Also, raiding is only worth the risk for devout party loyalists.248
Voters must be quite committed to their party's success in order to have
the foresight and strategizing raiding requires. This is an unrealistic ex-
pectation for a country that is reluctant to vote, much less participate in
party politics and strategizing. 249 Indeed, raiding requires a certain
243. Voters may cross over because they sincerely want the other party's candidate to succeed,
they believe the other party's candidate is more likely to win, or they believe the other party's candi-
date will not be able to defeat their party's candidate in the general election. See supra Part III.A.
244. "Overall, the prevalence of sincere voting confirms the findings of many studies of pri-
mary systems and voting behavior, and tends not to support early fears about mischievous voting
under open and blanket primaries." See Jonathan Cohen, Thad Kousser, & John Sides, Sincere Vot-
ing, Hedging, and Raiding: Testing a Formal Model of Crossover Voting in Blanket Primaries 23
(Sept. 2, 1999) (internal citations omitted) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Political Sci-
ence Department, University of California, Berkeley); "Studies also conclude that crossover voting
with malicious intent simply does not occur." Reed, No. C005419FDB at 25. See also discussion
infra Part IV.E.3.
245. Jones, 984 F. Supp. at 1297.
246. JEWELL & MOREHOUSE, supra note 17, at 106.
247. See Jones, 530 U.S. at 578.
248. JEWELL & MOREHOUSE, supra note 17, at 128.
249. "After the 1982 election voters in Michigan-an open primary state-were asked in a
survey whether they always voted in the same party's primary or shifted from time to time . .
[A]lmost half said they shifted back and forth between party primaries." id. at 127.
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amount of skill. 250 In order for voters to be willing to risk that their can-
didate of choice will not be nominated, they have to be informed as to
the likelihood that their party's candidate will advance to the primary
without their vote, they have to know which candidate from the opposing
party is considered weaker than their party's candidate, and they have to
know the likelihood of that candidate advancing to the general election
with their vote.25 1 Raiding requires some level of party organization to
educate party loyalists about races where party raiding is likely to suc-
252ceed. This presupposes a level of voter sophistication that is simply notrealistic in modem American politics. 253
2. Raiding is Theoretically Possible in All Primary Systems
Even if party raiding was a real threat, the existence of raiding
should not have been used to invalidate the Washington primary because,
assuming it took place, it is not unique to the blanket primary. The Jones
district court correctly recognized that raiding is no more likely under a
blanket primary than under an open primary. 4 Even in a closed primary
in which voters are required to state party affiliation well in advance of
the primary election, raiding is still possible.255 Voters wishing to raid the
other party's primary are simply required to plan farther in advance and
to register for the opposing party.256 Admittedly, this feature of closed
primaries "deters raiding in one way that the blanket primary does not
[because] [a] partisan voter who switches party allegiances just before
the election in order to cast a raiding vote must give up the right to vote
for candidates of his or her choice in races in which he has no desire to
raid. 2 57 This is especially true in states requiring party registration
months before the primary election. 258 Therefore, eliminating blanket
primaries will, at most, increase the amount of raiding that occurs in
closed primaries. Voters willing to sacrifice a vote for their own party's
candidate in order to raid the other party's primary will find themselves
forced into raiding the other races as well.
250. Id.
251. See Jones, 984 F. Supp. at 1298.
252. "[T1n order to be effective, 'raiding' by voters requires organized and elaborate complicity
among many persons." NEUBORNE & EISENBERG, supra note 4, at 177.
253. See id.
254. Jones, 984 F. Supp. at 1300.
255. Id. at 1298.
256. Id.
257. O'Callaghan v. State, 914 P.2d 1250, 1261 (Alaska 1996).
258. Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 761 (1973).
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3. Raiding is a Party Problem, Not a Government Problem
If party raiding and ticket-splitting should be discouraged, it is not
the responsibility of states to do so. Party raiding and ticket-splitting are
motivated not by the structure of the primary but by intra- and inter-party
politics. 259 It is irresponsible for parties to rely on state governments to
solve their raiding and ticket-splitting woes. Voters' intent to crossover
stems from a poor offering of candidates rather than from the structure of
the primary system, so the onus is on the parties to discourage such be-
havior.
260
It is impossible to conclude whether crossover voting actually oc-
curs in Washington because there is no party registration. 26 1 There are
characteristics of elections that make certain types of crossover voting
more or less likely, however, which makes distinguishing the types of
262crossover voting possible without the use of voter polls and surveys.
The presence of an incumbent is associated with sincere crossover voting
by members of the opposing party.2 63 The presence of a disparity be-
tween the competitiveness of the parties' primaries increases strategic
crossover voting by members of the party with the uncompetitive pri-
mary into the party with the competitive primary unless one of the candi-
dates in the uncompetitive primary is an incumbent.264 Data show that
crossover voting still occurs in elections where one party is overwhelm-
ingly expected to win the general election, suggesting that the motivation
behind this admittedly strategic crossover voting is hedging rather than
raiding.265 Put simply, parties lose votes when facing strong competition,
whether from an incumbent or a newcomer. The answer to raiding and
other types of crossover voting, then, is for parties to offer stronger can-
didates. Parties should not be permitted to manipulate the candidate
nomination process to shirk their responsibility for offering a strong op-
positional voice.
Ticket-splitting, a related trend whereby a voter votes for candi-
dates from more than one party in the same election, is not a new phe-
nomenon. It has been around almost as long as the primary itself.266 Pos-
sible explanations for ticket-splitting include the rise of issue-centered
politics, the increased emphasis on candidates and their personalities, the
growing value of incumbency, and the widening disconnect between par-
259. See Jones, 984 F. Supp. at 1298.
260. Id.
261. Reed, No. C005419FDB at 25-26.
262. See Cohen et al. supra note 244.
263. See id. at 17.
264. Id. at 18, 22.
265. See id. at 15.
266. See supra Part ll.B.
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ties and voters.267 Those voters who are frustrated with both the Democ-
ratic and Republican Parties may find little recourse in the existence of
third party and independent candidates because most Americans view
voting for these candidates as a waste of their vote.268
Again, the answer to this party problem lies within the parties
themselves. The major political parties must organize and play a more
prominent role in the voting patterns of American citizens. A change in
election protocol is no substitute for some focused party politicking to
bridge the disconnect between parties and their constituents. If parties
long for the historic days of party loyalists, they should make strides to
earn the trust of voters and demonstrate their continued relevance.
Granted, the solution may not be quite so simple for third party and inde-
pendent candidates, but that does not alter the simple truth that enticing
voters is the responsibility of candidates and parties, not state legislators.
4. Misplaced Emphasis on Voter Intent
It is useful to note the role the courts play when they permit states
to adopt legislation aimed to curb party raiding. When recognizing the
associational right of voters, the courts ordinarily do not assess the sub-
jective intent behind voters in voting for candidates of a particular
party. 269 The courts are not concerned about whether this type of associa-
tion stems from a lifelong adherence to party principles or a coin toss.
Only if the association can fairly be termed "raiding" are the courts con-
cerned with subjective intent.
The reason for the sudden concern with party intent is that raiders
are viewed as harmful to party interests, meaning that their associational
right is deserving of less protection. In a sense, the argument seems to be
that party raiders' associational interests, because they are strategic, are
somehow less sincere or genuine than those of voters who vote within
their party.27° Such is not necessarily the case, however. A raider's desire
to associate with a party may actually be far more genuine and spirited
than that of a disinterested voter who pays little attention to party politics
and votes for candidates from one party by chance or circumstance. Party
raiders are no less members of a party than are straight-ticket party vot-
ers. The key difference is that party raiders choose to associate with the
267. SABATO & LARSON, supra note 7, at 123-124.
268. See id. at 126-127.
269. Party affiliation, whether registered or merely professed, is a proxy for subjective intent.
See, e.g., Jones, 530 U.S. at 578-79.
270. In fact, this is the basis for distinguishing raiders from hedgers, who vote for the opposing
party's candidate that they would most like to see win if their party's candidate does not, and from
sincere crossovers, who vote for the opposing party's candidate as their first choice. See supra Part
III.A.
2006]
Seattle University Law Review
party to advance a different interest (election of a candidate from a dif-
ferent party) than do other party adherents. This may also translate into a
desire to associate with the party for a more limited time period than is
true for typical party members. These voters should not be denied the
right to associate with the parties of their choice merely because they
employ a calculated and ends-based rationale to voting.
5. A Blanket System is Worth It
Even if more closed primaries are effective at preventing party raid-
ing, blanket primaries are still a better system of candidate nomination.
This is because closed primaries, to the extent that they prevent party
raiding, also prevent more desirable forms of crossover voting. Surely a
party would not mind having members of another party vote for its can-
didates if the voters did so because the party's candidate was preferred
over all alternatives or because the voters' preferred candidates were
considered unlikely to succeed in the general election. These types of
crossover voting, sincere voting and hedging, pose none of the associa-
tional concerns typical of party raiders but would be equally deterred by
a non-blanket primary. Embracing the blanket primary could ultimately
strengthen parties by enticing voters to be more active in party affairs
and ensuring the election of more popular and representative candidates.
V. CONCLUSION
Primary elections occupy a particularly important role in modern
American politics. One wonders whether the party leaders of the early
1900s fully grasped the significance of the decision to forfeit control
over candidate nomination to states. They would probably be quite
shocked to see how candidate nomination, previously considered an in-
ternal party affair, has become almost completely integrated into the po-
litical machinery of state government.
Perhaps the major political parties have launched an attack on state
political primary election processes in an effort to reclaim control over
candidate nomination and to undo what they perceive to be a grave mis-
take. Jones and Reed, which together constitute the party-driven aboli-
tion of the blanket primary in American politics, mark their dramatic
success in so doing. What these cases fail to recognize is that the era of
candidate nomination by primary has come and gone. Today's political
primary is not merely a means of selecting the candidate to bear the party
label; it is often about selecting the candidate who will hold office and
represent the entire electorate.
Precisely because primary elections are just that, elections, it is
nonsensical and undemocratic to allow parties to exclude certain types of
[Vol. 29:449
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voters from participating on the grounds that parties are akin to private
organizations. Moreover, studies suggest that voters who crossover to
another party's primary do so in order to vote for someone they perceive
as being a better candidate or having a better chance of winning the gen-
eral election. When viewed this way, the concern that people of other
political affiliations will participate in a party's primary seems less
damning of the blanket primary system and more commendable as one of
its potential virtues.
